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Some observations on 
"ISSUES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES" 
with a view to designing 
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON RELATED ISSUES 
by Professor Ann Seidman 
I. ON METHODOLOGY: 
1 
This little book provides a useful overall survey of the 
issues of Sub-Saharan African economic development, and presents 
several more detailed case studies relating to specific 
countries. I will not here try to make a detailed evaluation .:of 
all the issues raised. Instead, I will focus on key debates which 
suggest areas for future possible collaborative comparative 
research needed to formulate more appropriate strategies for 
development to overcome the crisis that today engulfs most 
African, and for that matter, most Third World countries. 
In this connection, I would like to make an observation 
concerning the method of analysis employed throughout the book. 
Obviously, this is an issue for discussion, but it is one which 
will inevitably become important if we are to work together to 
design collaborative research to learn from the last several 
decades of African experience compared to that of China. 
As has no doubt become obvious from our earlier discussions, 
I am convinced that a problem-solving approach provides an 
important foundation for assessing alternative explanations and 
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2 
proposals for solutions to the kinds of development problems the 
J Third World ~aces today(!). From this perspective, it seems to 
me necessary, first, to adequately identify the scbpe and nature 
of the crisis currently confronting African countr~es; and then-
- and more important -- to explicitly and critically consider all 
the alternative theories, widely debated in thiYd world 
countries, that purport to guide explanations and proposals for 
solution of that crisis. These range, of course, from neo-
classical IMF/supply side analyses through various pragmatic 
institutionalist/basic needs approaches to socialist/historical 
materialist outlooks. The critical assessment of all the 
available explanations for the crisis suggested by each set of 
theories must aim to determine which seems most consistent with 
the objective evidence available. Only this will provide a sound 
basis on which policy makers can propose a strategy logically 
designed to addresses the causes of the crisis. Only this will 
ble them to weigh the benefits and costs of their proposal in 
light of a thorough knowledge of the objective factors it must 
overcome, as well as the resources which it may utilize. Policy 
makeYs can then analyze the consequences of efforts to implement 
similar stYategies in other countries to identify, in advance, 
1. This methodology is described in D. Kalyalya, K. 
Mhlanga, A. Seidman and J. Semboja, Aid and Development in 
Southern Africa: Evaluating a Participatory Learning PYocess 
<Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985), especially Chapter 2. CI 
have given a copy of that book to Prof. Ge Ji for the Institute 
library, and wo~ld be happy to discuss the methodology in depth). 
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3 
the possible pitfalls(2). Only in this sense can comparative 
research facilitate the formulation of improved development 
stra·tegies. 
In "Issues of Economic development: The Sub-Saharan 
C•:•tmtries," however, the authors for the mo:•st part have not 
explicitly identified the theoretical expla~ations that guide 
their research. Yet their choice of facts to describe suggests 
they may have implicitly adopted as a guide a kind mixed supply -
side/pragmatic approach significantly influenced by the 
availability of evidence provided by IMF-World Bank sources. This 
may explain why so few of the chapters discuss in any depth the 
institutional structures, class relationships, and 
characteristics of the state that many Africanists elsewhere 
conclude have fostered the distorted resource allocation patterns 
they picture. It may also explain the seemingly wide divergence 
of several of the authors' conclusions from those of the recent 
UN ECA Report on alternative strategies which sharply criticises 
the consequences of the IMF-World Bank type structural adjustment 
programs and urges research ·fo:•rmu 1 ate an alternative 
2. It should be underscored that no country can simply 
transfer development policies that appear successful in another 
country and expect the same results. Inevitably, the 
circumstances that make tho:•se po:•l i c ies "succeed" in co:••.mtr-y A 
will differ from those in country B (see, eg, Ann and Robert B. 
Seidman, A Methodology for Law and Economic Development in China, 
paper presented at Shandong Univesity~ May 14, 1989) 
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4 
development strategyC3l. 
If valid, this observation underscores the potential 
benefits of collaborative research to explore the comparative 
experiences of post World War II African and Chinese efforts to 
create new institutions to help overcome the poverty and 
powerlessness characteristic of most Third World countries. 
Because of their qualitatively different historically and 
geographically shaped social, economic and political 
characteristics, the people of one country can never simply adopt 
development strategies that appear successful in another. They 
may, however, learn what issues are most important, and what 
mistakes to avoid. In other words, they may utilize theories, 
developed and tested in one context to guide research as to the 
kinds of difficulties they may expect in another. 
My observations on specific chapters, below, are presented 
in the hope that, as US and Chinese scholars working together 
with our African colleagues, we can design and conduct 
collaborative participatory and problem-solving research which 
may facilitate formulation of more effective Third World 
development strategies. 
3. See Report recently adopted by the Ministers of Planning 
and of Finance in Addis Ababa, entitled African Alternative to 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (AA-SAPl: A Framework for 
Transformation and Recovery, 1989 (E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.2l. 
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Chapte·r I: MACRO ISSUES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA by Chen Zongde: 
As an overall review, this chapteY encompasses many 
impoytant issues. Written in 1984, howeveY, it seems to gloss 
over widespread criticisms that AfYican and other scholaYs have 
raised concerning the kinds of analyses endorsed by the IMF and 
the World Bank (4). Even mild py~Jse Cp. 3)fc•r the CameYoun, 
Ivory Coast and Kenyan development policies hardly appears 
justified, even from a caYeful reading of the case studies the 
bcrok includes. Furthermore, although Tanzania's per capita 
income remained among the lowest on the continent, the Tanzanian 
people benefitted from a relatively high if not the highest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa Physical Quality of Life I nde~: ( PQL I) 
<The chapters on these countries are discussed below). This 
raises questions as to the criteria researchers should adopt for 
evaluating development "success." 
Several of the issues Chen discusses might benefit from 
extended participatory research in collaboration with Africans. 
Fr:•r example, the expansion of export agriculture, fostered by 
institutions inherited from the colonial era, utilized the best 
4. The Swedish International Development Association, for 
example, hosted a conference in 1983 that explicitly documented 
evidence supporting the already wide-spread crticism of the Berg 
Report. The proceedings of the conference have been published 
in English, but I don't have a copy or the reference here. I 
suppose it could be obtained from the Swedish Embassy. 
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6 
lands near available transport networks. Colonial regimes had 
deliberately disrupted pre-existing subsistence agriculture to 
coerce Africans, mainly men, to work as low-cost labor in mines 
and cash crop farms ( . .~n West Africa as sharecroppers, 
typically getting about a third of the crop's value, compared to 
two-thirds for the land owners; in East, Central and South 
Africa, on settler owned commercial farms.) Continuing after 
political independence, this institutionalized pre• cess 
marginalized food crops and who cultivated them--
primarily women, old fcol k, and children using outmoded 
technologies. To integrate agriculture into a balanced national 
(and ultimately regietna 1) ecetnomy capable of providing 
increasingly productive employment and rising living standards 
for all Africans, requires research into the functioning of these 
historically-shaped institutions. Perhaps much could be learned 
from research comparing that experience to China's relating to 
var ic••.ts forms collective and individual productive 
agricultural institutietns. 
Research could also explore how, in Africa, the population 
problem presents itself as compared to that in China. Although 
the objective conditions differ considerably, some parallels 
seems apparent in the attitudes of rural populations, especially 
in the case of individual peasant families cultivating the land 
on their own, who tend to view children as essential farm labor 
and a guarantee of security in their future old age. In Africa, 
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at least, this suggests the key to achieving population planning 
rests in attaining development of agriculture and industry in 
ways required to reduce hand farm labor and provide social 
security. Can anything be learned here from a comparative study 
of the consequences of China's shift from collective to 
individual peasant production about the factors affecting 
population control in Africa? 
In Africa, uneven development persists not only between 
countries, but -- as is true even in the much larger territory of 
China -- within natinal boundaries. In Africa, this reflects the 
pattern of colonial capitalist penetration perpetuated and even 
aggravated by continued post-independence reliance on export-
oriented, rather than integrated national (and regional) 
development strategies. A comparative study might help discover 
the role of political economic institutions in perpetuating this 
process, andproposing alternative approaches. 
Chen correctly 
agricultural policies. 
emphasizes the necessity of improving 
I wonder, however, it there is not a need 
to explain why African industrialization has worsened, rather 
than helping to solve, the problems confronted. Numerous studies 
suggest that existing institutional structures -- particularly 
the transnational corporate manufacturing firms that own shares, 
provide management and technologies,and control the external 
markets, as well as state planners and enterprises -- have 
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8 
influenced the post independence industrialization patterns that 
have played the negative role Chen describes(5). Studies of the 
African state (and regional) industrialization policies and the 
institutions developed to implement them compared to those 
adopted in China might contribute significantly to industrial 
strategies more likely to foster balanced integrated development. 
The discussion government intervention notes the 
reduction of "unnecessary gc•vernment' s inter vent ion in ecc•nomi c 
activities and paying attention to the role of market system and 
p r i vat e sector " ( p. 15) . It fails, however, to note that in 
Africa this "refo:oy-m" has been a conditic•n •:•f IMF and WoYld Bank 
assistance. This, as the UN Economic Commission fol' Afy-ica 
RepoYt points o:out, has thwarted goveYnment effol'ts to restructuy-e 
externally dependent economies and in so:ome cases contYibuted to 
deindustl'ializa·tio:on. As the cury-ent A·frican cr(~,§j/ illustYates, V1/ 
international "m.:\rket forces" aYe far frc•m the competitive model 
assumed by those who urge abandonment of state intervention in 
foreign trade and payments; and turning banking and finance over 
to private, pl'ofit maximizing institutions everywhel'e in Africa 
has not only tended to increase foreign domination, but also to 
aggravate investment patterns and inflational'y 
pressures. It is true that nowhey-e can government supervise and 
5. See A. Seidman, "How Southern African industrialization 
undeYmined peasant .agricultun:" in Jcn.tYnal o:of Af·rican Studies, 
1987; this will appear as a chapter in a forthco:oming bo:ook, A. 
Seidman, ed., Rethinking AgricultuYal Transformation in So:outhern 
· Africa <Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1989). 
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administer aspect~s of devf? 1 opment in every sector; the 
cultivation and marketing of cabbages, for example, appear better 
left to individual peasant initiative. Yet the state 
constitutes the only instrument by which politically organized 
societies can shape development policies. I ·f t h i r d WQ r 1 d 
countries seek to build key industries like irCtn and steel or 
chemicals, government must play a role. A careful comparative 
study of how government institutiCtns have worked in Africa in 
different sectors Ctf economic development compared with thCtse in 
China might contribute much to a better understanding of the 
institutional changes needed to ensure that, in the quitf? 
different circumstances prevailing in each country, gCtvernment 
plays its essential role in critical sectors. 
Chapter 2: SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT SEVERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES OF AFRICA 
by Tan Shizh•:.ng. 
This chapter explores in more detail some of the important 
issues mention~d above. Again, I will focus on sCtme of the 
questions it suggests that seem to require further research. 
First, I wonder if section A isn't misleading when it implies 
a primary task confronting the newly independent countries was 
the ·transformation of "th€~ pre-capitalist econCtmic compCtnent." 
Many scholars have shown that the cCtlCtnial rulers had 
fundamentally altered the pre-capitalist ecCtnCtmies tCt coerce 
Africans into a capitalist cCtmmodity economy, primarily to serve 
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10 
Even in 
West Africa, Uganda and Tanzania, where peasant agriculture 
produced export crops, colonial tax and other policies pushed 
hundreds of thousands of Africans into the migratory labor force 
that, for a strata of wealthy peasants, made export farming very 
profitable. In East, Central and Southern Africa, land 
alienation, coupled with taxes and discriminatory marketing and 
credit po:•licies, broke up previously self-s•.tfficient agricultural 
communities and forced millions of Africans to work for below-
poverty-line wages in mines, on farms, and eventually factories. 
The real need was (and is) toprovide African working people and 
peasants with the skills and resources required to participate 
fully in balanced, integrated n.:\ tiona 1 (and ·regional) 
development. 
The primary task confronting the new governments, then, was 
(and remains) to exert control over the commanding heights of the 
modern export enclaves which enriched a tiny minority of (usually 
settler) managers-·=·~ners or siph•:•ned locally-g~?nerated investable 
surpluses out of the African economies. Only by capturing these 
surpluses, and reinvesting them to provide skills and resourceds 
to the mass of the people in a more balanced, nationally 
integrated industrial and agricultural development could the 
governments hope to provide increasingly productive jobs and 
rising living standards for their populations. In some East, 
Central and Southern African countries, this neccessitated land 
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11 
reform which, for the most part, remained unrealized. All •:•f 
this points to the need to assess the effect on efforts to 
integrate agriculture and industry into nationally-oriented 
development of alternative institutional structures like: a) 
marketing and production cooperatives, marketing boards, 
processing and storage activities, b) cooperatives, state farms, 
etc.; c) state versus private methods of providing credit; and so 
for·th. 
studies. 
This might provide a fruitful field for comparative 
Section B on "state-·owned economy" likewise raises impo:•rtant 
questions which would benefit from comparative study. In 
reality, few African states fully "natic•nalized" much. For the . 
most part, they acquired shares -- sometimes more, sometimes less 
than 5li. -- to:• ~blish what in China, today, are called "joint 
ventures." Without ad(;>quate plans o'f in!;titutional controls to:• 
guide the relationship to these enterprises to national 
dev<elopment, th<ese seldom playt?d ti'H? ho:•ped-for roles. Adopting 
t;~,e "autonomous" characteristics typical of state enterprises in 
capitalist countries (often on the British or French models), the 
governments left the foreign partneYs, ben.t on ma~;imizing their 
own global profits, to control management, marketing, technology 
and financial decisions. Incidentally, top government and 
political personnel holding posts in these enterprises often 
emerged as a new "bureaucratic bourgeo:oisie" that increasingly 
exercised state power, not in the interest of the mass, but to 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
enhance their own positions of power and privlege. 
1 ~, ..... 
In this area, 
too, comparative studies of the African and Chinese experiences 
might prove useful. 
On page 35, Tan mentions a "unitary economy," a concept 
which is not generally used in the African literature. If he 
means a country dependent on one or a few exports, it would be 
inaccurate to say that it has a history o·f "several thousand 
years." More important., hc•wever this point emphasizes the need 
to research the way existing institutions perpetuate the dominant 
role of one or a few exports, and to assess experiences with 
alternative metnods of exerting control over the commanding 
heights in order to achieve more balanced integrated national 
development. A comparative analysis of African and Chinese 
foreign trade institutions might prove illuminating. 
Chapter 3: ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT by Wu Zhaoqi 
Wu's analysis of African development tends to focus on GNP 
growth, rather than to examine the distorted pattern of resource 
allocation fostered by the institutional structures inherited 
from the colonial past. This sort of statistical review, 
however, fails to reveal the increased dependence on the 
competitive expansion of crude or semi-processed exports, instead 
of attainment of integrated national and regional development. 
Unfortunately, African countries have not increased their 
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13 
economioindependence as a result of nationalization, 
suggests. Instead, the transnationals have, for the most part, 
simply reduced their direct investment in 6wnership, while 
retaining their grip on management, technology and marketing, 
which facilitated their drain of the investable surplu~ locally 
generated. In other words, the form, but not the essential 
content, of the exploitative relationships persisted. Since the 
1980s, as a result of their distorted externally dependent 
pattern of development and worsening terms of trade, almost every 
African country found itself engulfed in crisis. 
The assertion that some African governments ''blindly pursued 
:;ocialism" (p. 43) tends to neglect tee:tchings of the historic 
e:r;per ience colonial and neo-colonial capitalism that 
impoverished the African peoples6. Nevertheless, it does 
underscore the need to make careful comparative studies of the 
relationships between existing institutions and prevailing forces 
O:•f pro:oduction (including "human capital") as the ·foundation for 
implementing ~ step-by-step transformation towards socialist 
development. Here, again, a comparative analysis with China's 
experiences might provide valuable insights. 
6. Note that, because of this experience and to retain 
legitimacy, almost every African government, including Kenya's, 
declared it sought to implement socialist policies. In reality, 
the government leaders often mouthed socialist rhetoric, but 
showed little concern for any scientific meaning of the word or 
the essential process of building a new social system. 
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In light of the UN ECA Report (and a great deal of other 
e~vidence) Wu's discussion of "readjustment" programs appears too 
These typically still emphasize agricultural exports and 
fail to analyze the objective role of existing institutions in 
light of the objective conditions. The role of foreign capital 
has generated major debate in Africa. Many studies show that 
creatic•n of "ho:•spitable investment climates" that not only 
welcome, but even subsidize (through tax credits, infrastructure 
e:-t;pendi tures, etc.) any and all transnational 
activities makes their impact on development negative. This 
suggests the need for careful planning of national and regional 
resources to determine criteria for admitting investments 
designed to make specific contributions of technologies, access 
to markets, etc. Research should help identify the appropriate 
forms and roles of state enterprise, rather than simply dismantle 
all government efforts to intervene to build increasingly 
industrialized nationally and regionally integrated economies. 
As for the po:::•ssibilities of aro:•using the "enthusiasm of domestic 
private capitalists," a mo:•re detailed study of the these groups' 
skills, capital, and motivations in Africa might lead to more 
realistic expectations as to their potential contribution to 
development. A comparative study of the characteristics of the 
newly emergent private sector in China might prove instructive. 
Wu's discussion of inter-regional cooperation opens another 
important area of study. He rightly emphasizes the SADCC 
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15 
cooperation as a fruitful example. But his discussion of the 
strictural adjustment programs, especially those fostering 
competitive devaluation of national currencies, fails to note 
their destructive consequences in burden o:•f 
national crises on the poor. Research here could focus on 
existing trade and payments institutions in Africa and among 
China and its Asian trading partners in order to to contribute to 
proposal for strengthened south-south and regional economic 
co:u:oper at .icon. 
Chapter 4: PROBLEMS CONFRONTING AFRICAN AGRICULTURE by Chen 
Zonge 
I wonder whether it is true that the core of Africa's 
current crisis lies in agriculture Cp. 73) I would argue, 
rather, that the core of the crisis lies in the way the ruling 
"bureaucratic bo::o•xrgeoisie" continued after independence to gear 
the entire structure of the typical African economy to the 
export of crude agricultural or mineral products, the import of 
manufactures and the drain cof investable surplus. This 
perpetuated neglect of food producing areas (7), food production 
7. The Zimbabwe "success story," discussed below, reflects 
the development of agriculture, not to provide food for the 
people many of whom suffered malnutrition even after 
indpendence -- but for the mining sectors of southern Africa. 
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16 
technologies, and food producers (primarily women(8). The 
negative consequences of industrial development in most African 
countries reflected, as well as fostered, the po~t-independence 
governments' failure to alter this model. 
It is essential to distinguish between the agricultural 
problems affecting, not only North and Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
also between regions in Sub - Saharan Africa, especially between 
the peasant cash cropping areas as differentiated from colonial 
settler agriculture. Incidentally, estimates of investment in 
agriculture Cp. 81) typically neglect the peasants' "human 
capital" investments, although these contribute a major share .:· ·f 
the total agricultural investment in Africa. 
As for governments' role in marke·ting boards, 
transportation, and processing, this was typically introduced in 
the colonial era because the private sector either failed to 
provide the necessary services at all, or charged so much for 
them that the settler farmers called for government assistance to 
enable them to profit from their cash crop production, while 
peasants simply refused to enter into cash crop production at 
C:'\ll. This also held true for introduction of marketing 
co.:oper o:\ t i ves. Settler farmers established . markeing cooperatives 
for their own crops, excluding Africans. In West Africa, Uganda 
8. For evidence relating to the special problems of women 
in agriculture and the whole economic development process, see 
Kalyalya et al, op. cit., pp.l06 ff. 
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and Tanganyika (now Tanzania), peasant farmers seeking to escape 
middleman exploitation, began to introduce them with government 
assistance before independence(9). 
The problems of agricultural pricing policy require careful 
research in each case. The effects of worsening terms of trade 
characteristic of agricultural exports in the 1970s and 80s 
inevitably reduced returns to peasants, reducing their incentives 
to expand production. These must be distinguished from the 
consequences~f inadequate domestic price policies. Lack o·f 
adequate transport and storage also hinder expanded output. 
Unfortunately, IMF advisors typically assume government pricing 
policies, alone, without regard to other operative factors, 
discourage peasant agriculture. On the other hand, they also 
automatically tend to assume that balance of payments deficits 
arise because of overvalued currency, (rather than worsening 
terms of trade). Hence, they press for devaluation. Because of 
oversupply on the world markets, however, devaluation does little 
to increase a country's world sales. Instead, it simply reduces 
real returns to the peasants as rising costs of imports stimulate 
inflationary pressures. Competitive devaluation among African 
countries also tends to thwart efforts 
tre:"!de .. Comparative study .of African 
to increase intra-African 
r~:t;per ience with Chinls as 
9. Lord Lugard called these an 
"indin~ct rule"; s~:?e hils introduction 
Development" cited in R.B. Seidman, Law, 
<New York: Croom Helms, 1978) 
essential feature of 
toDuSautoy, "Cc•mmuni ty 
State and Development 
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the yuan's value has steadily declined since 1978 might prove 
fruitful. 
The issue of technology in Africa, too, requires study. In 
part, the question is how to increase the education, skills and 
capital of small peasants to facilitate a transition to the use 
of modern inputs while avoiding stratification that would limit 
the simultaneous expansion of the domestic market required to 
reduce dependence on exports. In other words, here, too, the 
issue is not simply how to acquire the appropriate technology, 
which requires determination of the appropriate industrial 
strategy; but also what kinds of institutions will facilitate its 
use and simultaneously contribute to more balanced, integrated 
national development. A comparative study of the kinds of 
institutions used to introduce new technologies in China and 
Africa might help to find answers to critical questions in this 
area. 
Chapter 5: ON THE PROBLEM OF AFRICAN DEBTS by Li Qiling 
Li formulates the problem well here. However, it may be 
argued that he neglects one aspect of the underlying explanation 
an understanding of which would facilitate formulation of 
appropriate solutions. He argues African countries lacked funds 
Cp. 92), but fails to point out that in fact their economies 
generated significant amounts of invest~ble surplus. Some 
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Africanists argue the cause of the apparent lack of capital lay 
in the new governments' failure to take measures to halt the 
drain of investable surpluses in the form of profits, interest, 
dividends and negative terms of trade. To claim that such 
measures frighten away foreign investment ignores the harsh 
reality that foreign investment declined sharply in the 1970s and 
80s anyway as transnational corporations reduced their direct 
holdings. Instead, they depended largely on loans, typically 
guaranteed by African and foreign governments, to finance the 
infrastructure required to expand lowcost exports and third world 
markets required to maximize their global business profits. The 
drain of investable surplus shifted from the form of profits to 
the high interest rates that Li describes (p. 95). 
Furthermore, African countries' currency devaluations, while 
reducing the real returns from their exports, tended to increase 
the cost of their foreign debts Cas well as all other imorts) 
since these were typically denominated in external 'hard' 
currencies. 
Li describes the other external and internal factors that 
have aggravated Africa's debt problems in recent years. It may 
be argued, however, that most of these reflect African 
governments' failure to capture and redirect their own national 
investable surpluses to restructure their distorted internal 
resource allocation and reduce their external dependence. Their 
vigorous efforts compete to attract foreign investments seriously 
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20 
undermined the contribution those investments might have made to 
their economies. But, in the continent-wide competition to 
create a hospitable investment climate, South Africa's minority-
ruled militry industrial complex won; it attracted roughly two 
times as much manufacturing investment as all the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa put together. All of which suggests the need to 
study how and with what institutional controls Third World 
countries should seek to obtain foreign investments that 
effectively complement their own efforts to capture their own 
locally generated investable surpluses to finance their own 
plans. 
CASE STUDIES: 
The case studies raise questions of detail that suggest the 
potential richness of comparative research directed at the 
critical development issues identified above. They also again 
raise methodological questions. For example, why does Dong start 
with Lewis' theory which, in typical neo-classical style, tends 
to ignore the historically-shaped class structures, and the role 
of the state and the legal order that coerced Africans into a 
migratory labor force? Doesn't starting with such a theory tend 
to obscure essential institutional questions that must be 
answered to evaluate Benin's development strategy, such as why 
agricultural cooperatives work in some cases, but not in others? 
or why one government bank works, but not others? or whether 
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Benin can really depend on expanded agricultural exports, or 
should it seek to develop regional cooperation with neighboring 
countries? These and many more institutional issues would provide 
fruitful ground for comparative research. 
Again, in the case of Cameroun, wouldn't Zhuang's study have 
benefitted from an analysis of the class structures and the 
distributio:on . o:of bene·fits resulting fn:om e:;;ploitation o·f eoil. 
In recent years,eoil not better develeopment peolicies--
preovided the key seource eof increased GNP and revenues which he 
s•.t9ges-3ts reflect "successful" development. Zhuang mentieons 
that the emirs ceontinued teo govern the peasants C:p. 15'3), but 
deoes not provide evidence as to the ceonsequnences for peasant 
participation in the n.:1tion' s allf?ged "succf?ss." H1~ mentions the 
role of the French ( p. 164) and transnational corpr:orations (p. 
112), but provides little data to reveal either the share eof 
Cameroun's investable surplus they d r e:'\i ned away or the 
consequences for Camerounian investment. 
Gao states Kenya's development is ''considered one of the 
best" but he does not evaluate the criteria used for that 
assertion. Later, his own data reveals the growth of inequality 
and poverty, but he doesn't show why or how the strategy adopted 
by the Kenyan government contributed teo it. His discussion eof 
Kenya's agricultural strategy ignores its role in feostering 
stratification and greowing unemployment. He deoes not explain 
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that a significant factor in Kenya's industrial growth was its 
status as a East African regional transnational cerrporate 
subcente·r. Nor does he discuss how the shift to laberr intensive 
manufactured e:t;ports (if successful, given Third Worlcl 
competition in this field) would simply cernstitute a new way of 
extracting investable surplus produced by low cerst Kenyan labor. 
He discusses joint ventures, but doesn't show herw the form they 
took ·fa:•stered the emergence of a "bure.:\ucratic bour·geoisie" that, 
together with Africanization of commerce, contributed to a 
significant new African ruling class. In sherrt, his analysis 
deres nert identify the causal factors that inevitably culminated 
in Kenya's 1980s crisis, or herw the gc•vernment' s "adjustments" 
tended to throw its burden on the poor. 
Qian's analysis reveals the imperrtance of eril in Nigeria's 
development. However, he doesn't explain how the everlving class 
and state structures contributed ter the the nation's failure to 
capture and reinvest the resulting investable surplus in balanced 
national development. As a result, when oil prices plummeted, 
Nigeria, too, found itself engulfed in a pervasive crisis. 
He characterizes Zimbabwe's develerpment as "quite 
successful," but again neglects to pr•:•vide criteria f•:•r that 
<assessment. It might be noted that, under conditierns of UDI, the 
pre-liberation government had ended all profit remittances (a 
policy quickly reversed by the newly independent government which 
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pursued conventional western wisdom to attract foreign capital). 
The resulting reinvestment of 25% of the GNP led to a 8-10% 
growth of industry from 1966 to 75. This made Zimbabwe, next to 
South Africa, the most industrialized country in sub-Saharan 
Africa. At the same time, the 6000 (white) commercial farms that 
owned the most fertile, well-watered half the nation's farm land 
(of which they only used about half productively) employed 
African labor for a pittance to produce 90% of the country's 
marketing crops. Meanwhile, 
African population fell. 
the real living standards of the 
One may question whether post-independence reconstruction of 
Zimbabwe was "more di·f·ficult" than el!sewhere, 
whites' role was as important as He suggests. 
and whethe ·r the 
In the past, land 
alienation and government sponsored discrimination had prevented 
African peasants from competing with white farmers; and denied 
them entry into managerial posts in industry and commerce. 
Nevertheless, there were far more Zimbabwe university and 
secondary school graduates at independence than elsewhere in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as well as a more skilled industrial labor force. 
Whatever the reality, despite the new government's socialist 
rhetoric, fear of losing white skills provided the rationale for 
the government adoption of a state capitalist policy of of 
sharply limited land reform and a form of collaboration with the 
transnational cc•r por a ti•:•ns which actually foste-red 
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deindustrialization. He's evaluation overstates the extent of 
(l, 
agricultural rsettlement, which provided land to less than 10% of 
the 900,000 peasant families struggling to ~urvive on the 
communal areas (former tribal trust lands <10}). The alleged 
"s•.1ccess" of communal land peasants in reality related only to 
the 15% somewhat larger peasants who lived on relatively fertile 
lands and receive the credit provided by the state Agricultural 
Bank(l.1). Education expanded rapidly, but failed to relate 
adequately to the technical and productive structures, so that by 
the mid 1980s nine out of ten high school graduates failed to 
find jobs appropriate to their acquired skills. The cause of 
unemployment did not, however, lie in excess population (compare, 
p. :256) • Rather it reflected industrial and agricultural growth, 
not to meet the needs of the population, but to maximize the 
profits of the transnational corporations and domestic commercial 
classes (now including members of the emerging African 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie<12}). 
10. The pre-independence government's experts had said that 
at least a third of those families must be removed from the 
reserves to end the overcrowding and overuse that rendered them 
incapable of supporting their inhabitants. 
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11. For details see Dan Weiner's chapter in Seidman, ed., 
Rethinking Agricultural Trans·f.:•rmation .in Southern Africa, op. cit. • 
12. It is unclear why He uses sources like the Whitsun 
FCttllldation ·for this evaluati.:•n, since it cCtnstit•.lt(~S a "liberal" • 
capitalist (largely white) cCtnsultant grCtup which aimed tCt 
persuade Zimbabwe's new rulers to adCtpt the Kenyan mCtdel tCt 
ensure implementation of typical British "going in order to stay" • 
policies. 
• 
• 
• 
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Failure to alter the inherited institutional structures to 
• retain the existing locally generated surpluses led to rapid 
expansion of foreign debt, and eventually to IMF intervention, • 
austerity and devaluation. The resulting limited "economic 
• grc•wth" did not benefit the mass •:•f the population: impo:•rted high 
tech machinery and equipment (replacing previously locally • 
produced labor intensive technologies) aggravated unemployment; 
• rising inflation wiped out the initial wage increases; and real 
living standards fell below 1980 levelsC13). • 
• Nan tends to overlook the extent to which the Europeans' 
invasion of Tanzania Cthen Tanganyika) imposed institutions that • 
coerced Africans into a cheap labor force. They forced Africans . 
• to work on foreign owned coastal sisal estates and peasant owned 
coffee and cotton farms as well as migrating to mining and farm • 
areas in neighboring colonies. In the mid 1960s, Tanzania's new 
• government initially sought to adopt policies incorporating the 
conventional western wisdom of attracting foreign investment, • 
but, in competition with Kenya, these failed. At the same time, 
• the government encouraged the peasants to multiply cash crop 
exports, but worsened terms of trade reduced their anticipated • 
earnings. These fact•:•r-s contributed to the 1967 Arusha 
• Declaration which sought to increase national control over the 
inhe·r i ted institutions go:ove·rning the commanding heights. • 
• 13.See Robert Davies article in Review of African Political 
Economy, approximately 1985 (! don't have the exact citation here) 
• 
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Unfortunately, however, the government did not exercise its 
partial control toformulate and implement an adequate industrial 
strategy to reduce the economies' dependenc~ on exports. In 
evaluating the consequences of the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa 
villagization, Nan may not have adequately considered the 
consequences of the war with Uganda, the early 1970s drought, and 
the worsened terms of trade which deprived Tanzania of much 
needed foreign exchange earnings to import the essential goods 
required by its still externally dependent economy. While the 
evaluation of the adjustment to the resulting crisis seem fair, 
further research into the details of the institutional changes 
introduced seems necessary to assess the underlying causes of the 
difficulties Tanzania confronted. 
III. CONCLUSION: 
In short, this overall survey raises many key issues 
relating to problems of development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Debates over details of the analysis, however, can really only be 
settled by further research relating, in particular, to the basic 
institutional changes made and their consequences for efforts to 
achieve national and regional integration capable of providing 
increasingly productive employment opportunities and rising 
living standards for the majority of Africans. In this sense, 
the book suggests a fruitful research agenda for comparative 
studies, not only of African countries' post-independence 
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experiences, but those in China. For this purpose, I would 
suggest we discuss the possibility working together with our 
African colleagues to utilize a participatory, problem-solving 
methodology to conduct comparative research. 
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